The Audit Log records every state-changing event in PromptGate: logins, credential CRUD, token CRUD, endpoint CRUD, guardrail toggles, OAuth flows, backups, and more. Append-only by convention (no UI to delete), filterable by time / event / project, exportable as CSV.

What gets logged

A non-exhaustive index of audit event keys:

Auth

Event	When
auth.login	Successful login
auth.login_failed	Wrong password / unknown user
auth.logout	User logged out
auth.token_invalid	API request with bad token
auth.scope_missing	API request with token lacking required scope

Projects

Event	When
project.created	A new project shell was provisioned
project.updated	Name, env or project-level settings changed
project.activated	Reactivated after a previous deactivate — traffic resumes
project.deactivated	Project marked inactive — every token returns 403 until reactivated
project.deleted	Project record removed (rare; manual operator action)

Endpoints (AI Gateway, API Gateway)

Event	When
endpoint.created	New AI Gateway endpoint (wizard or Management API)
endpoint.updated	Endpoint config changed — prompts, routing, limits, schemas
endpoint.deactivated	Endpoint flipped to is_active = false (returns 404 on call)
api_gateway_endpoint.created	New HTTP-proxy endpoint configured in an API Gateway project
api_gateway_endpoint.updated	Method allowlist, headers, auth-mode, or rate caps changed

Credentials

Event	When
credential.created	New provider API key stored (encrypted at rest)
credential.updated	Name or label changed (the secret itself uses credential.rotated)
credential.rotated	New secret minted; previous hash invalidated immediately
credential.deactivated	Operator pushed pause — endpoints using it will fail-over or 503
credential.deleted	Hard delete; rare and irreversible

Tokens

Event	When
token.created	New API token issued; plaintext shown once
token.updated	Name, allowlist, per-token caps, or metadata changed
token.rotated	Secret regenerated; prior bearer invalid immediately
token.activated	Reactivated after a previous deactivate
token.deactivated	Soft-disable — 401 on the gateway, reversible
token.revoked	Same effect as deactivate but framed as permanent in the UI
token.deleted	Hard delete; rare and irreversible

Guardrails

Event	When
guardrail.enabled	Toggled on (project / global)
guardrail.disabled	Toggled off
guardrail.blocked	A request was blocked by a guardrail

Providers

Event	When
provider.enabled	Provider toggled on globally (becomes routable)
provider.disabled	Provider toggled off — endpoints using it return 503

MCP Servers (mcp_gateway)

Event	When
mcp_server.created	New upstream MCP server configured
mcp_server.updated	URL, auth-mode or tool-allowlist changed
mcp_server.deactivated	Server flipped inactive — JSON-RPC traffic to it 404s

OAuth Connections

Event	When
oauth_connection.created	Connection record created (not yet linked to a provider account)
oauth_connection.connect_initiated	User clicked “Connect” — redirected to authorize URL
oauth_connection.connected	Token exchange succeeded; refresh token stored
oauth_connection.callback_error	Provider returned error=... on the redirect
oauth_connection.exchange_failed	Token exchange HTTP failure
oauth_connection.disconnected	Tokens cleared but connection record kept
oauth_connection.deleted	Connection record hard-deleted

Webhooks

Event	When
webhook.created	New webhook subscription registered
webhook.updated	URL, secret, event-subscriptions or active flag changed
webhook.test	“Send test” button used in the webhook detail page
webhook.deleted	Subscription removed

Model Pricing (admin)

Event	When
pricing.refreshed	php artisan pricing:refresh pulled the LiteLLM catalogue (cron or admin button)
pricing.saved	Operator added a manual pricing row via the admin UI
pricing.updated	Existing pricing row edited — auto rows flip to manual on edit
pricing.deleted	Pricing row removed

Backup / Export

Event	When
backup.exported	A ZIP archive was downloaded

Control Plane (write tools, tagged via=mcp_control_plane)

Event
control_plane.project.created
control_plane.token.created
control_plane.token.rotated
control_plane.token.revoked
control_plane.endpoint.activated
control_plane.endpoint.deactivated

The via=mcp_control_plane metadata distinguishes agent-driven mutations from UI ones — useful for spotting “did the agent break this, or did a human?”.

Event shape

Each row in audit_logs:

uuid          | "0e2f...c4"
event         | "credential.created"
severity      | "info" | "ok" | "warn" | "err"
actor_label   | "[email protected]"   (display name from session)
actor_user_id | 1                         (FK or null for system / API)
project_id    | 7                         (or null for global events)
target        | "OpenAI Production"       (the affected resource)
metadata      | {"slug": "openai-production"}  (JSON, free-form)
ip_address    | "10.0.0.42"
created_at    | "2026-05-06T10:14:22Z"

Viewing

Top-right user menu → Audit Log.

The page has:

• A searchable table sorted DESC by created_at.
• Time-range filters: Today, 7 days, 30 days, All.
• Free-text search across event, actor_label, target.
• Severity colour coding (info / ok / warn / err).
• One-click Export CSV for the current filter.

Filter examples

• Audit failed logins last 24h: time = Today, search = login_failed.
• What did the admin agent change today: search = via=mcp_control_plane.
• OAuth flow troubleshooting: search = oauth_connection.
• Find a deleted credential: search = credential.deleted.

CSV export

The export endpoint streams a CSV:

GET /audit/export?since=2026-05-01&until=2026-05-06

(Same filters as the UI — passed as query params.) Returns one row per event with all columns. Useful for piping into a SIEM or running ad-hoc analysis.

Retention

By default, forever. The audit_logs table grows with usage; for high-traffic gateways you may want to prune occasionally:

docker compose exec app php artisan tinker
\App\Models\AuditLog::query()->where('created_at', '<', now()->subYear())->delete();

Configurable retention policies (auto-prune at N days) are on the roadmap.

Webhook bridge

Every audit insertion fires matching webhooks. So you can get real-time notifications by registering a webhook with the matching event subscriptions — see Webhooks.

Why isn’t this strictly immutable?

The Community Edition lets the admin run arbitrary SQL via Tinker, and the schema doesn’t prevent UPDATE / DELETE. We don’t claim it’s tamper-proof — the goal is observability + accountability for an honest single-admin deployment, not a forensic guarantee against the admin.

If you need true immutability, ship audit events to an append-only sink (S3 with object-lock, an immutable log service) via webhook.

Best practices

• Review failed logins weekly. Brute-force probing shows up here even when rate limiting blocks individual attempts.
• Filter the audit log by project when investigating a project-specific incident.
• Use webhook subscriptions for time-sensitive events (token revocation, OAuth refresh failures).
• Export CSV monthly as part of your backup routine — gives you an offline trail.

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Next: Webhooks in the Administration section.

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